Caveat Emptor: “All Houses Wherein Men Have Lived and Died Are Haunted Houses.”

person in exercise clothing looking through magnifying glass at damage in home. Illustrating article by Richard A. Klass about Caveat Emptor

The buyer of a Brooklyn building sued the seller for fraud and breach of contract after the closing of title. The buyer made several claims against the seller, including that the roof was leaking, it wasn’t new, and the construction and renovations performed on the building were shoddy and done only to quickly “flip” the property. The buyer also claimed that the tenant’s signed estoppel certificate was false. The buyer’s attorney claimed that no ordinary amount of due diligence would have revealed that the roof was leaking; only destructive testing done prior to closing would have shown water intrusion or mold. The seller’s position was that any alleged defects in connection with the sale of the building could have been raised before the closing of title. Once the closing took place, any alleged defects were waived; the representations in the contract of sale merged with the transfer of title.

Disclaimers in the Contract of Sale

In the contract of sale between the seller and buyer, there were numerous clauses that contained specific disclaimers.[1] Among these disclaimers was the following one (which is fairly typical in real estate contracts):

The Purchaser acknowledges that they have physically inspected the Premises prior to signing this Contract and are aware of the physical condition of the Premises and agree to take the Premises in “AS IS CONDITION” in its present physical condition. Purchaser acknowledges that the Seller has made no representation or warranties and concerning the physical condition of the Premises other than those that are specifically set forth herein.

Doctrine of Caveat Emptor – Buyer Beware!

The seller retained Richard A. Klass, Esq., Your Court Street Lawyer, to defend the lawsuit brought by the buyer. A motion to dismiss the case was filed based on several legal arguments, first and foremost being the defense of caveat emptor (meaning that the buyer was responsible for checking the quality of his purchase).

New York adheres to the caveat emptor doctrine and imposes no duty on the seller to disclose any information concerning the premises when the parties deal at arm’s length, unless there is some conduct on the part of the seller which constitutes active concealment. Platzman v. Morris, 283 AD2d 561 [2 Dept. 2001]. As held by the Second Department in London v. Courduff, 141 AD2d 803 [2d Dept. 1988], “The buyer has the duty to satisfy himself as to the quality of his bargain pursuant to the doctrine of caveat emptor, which in New York State still applies to real estate transactions.”

As held in Simone v Homecheck Real Estate Services, Inc., 42 AD3d 518, 521 [2d Dept 2007], “Where the contract specifically disclaims the existence of warranties or representations, a cause of action alleging breach of contract based on such a warranty or representation cannot be maintained (see Bedowitz v Farrell Dev. Co., 289 AD2d 432 [2001]). Here, the contract of sale specifically provided that the premises had been inspected by the buyer and was being sold ‘as is’ without warranty as to condition, express or implied. Furthermore, a specific merger clause is contained in the rider to the contract and precludes the buyer from claiming that he relied on any of the sellers’ alleged misrepresentations (see London v Courduff, supra). In addition, because title to the property had closed and the deed was delivered, the doctrine of merger extinguished any claim the buyer may have had regarding the contract of sale (see Ka Foon Lo v Curis, 29 AD3d 525 [2006]). Hence, the cause of action to recover for breach of contract cannot be maintained and should have been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).”

Where the contract of sale, as in this case, contains a provision that the plaintiff is fully aware of the condition of the premises based upon his own inspection and is not relying upon any representations of the seller, any subsequent action for fraud is barred. Daly v. Kochanowicz, 67 AD3d 78 [2 Dept. 2009]; Platzman v. Morris, 283 AD2d 561, 563 [2 Dept. 2001] (“Since the contract contained a provision that the plaintiffs were fully aware of the condition of the premises based upon their own inspection and investigation, and not based upon any information or representations, written or oral, made by the sellers, the plaintiffs cannot claim fraud.”).

No ‘latent defect’ exception to the merger doctrine

The buyer argued in opposition to the motion that the merger doctrine did not apply to latent defects (which may only be discovered after occupancy of the premises). He incorrectly cited Fehling v Wicks, 179 Misc 2d 1041 [App Term 1999] as being a decision from the Second Department. It is actually a decision of the Appellate Term, Second Department. More importantly, the Fehling v Wicks decision has been rejected by the Appellate Divisions.

In Arnold v Wilkins, 61 AD3d 1236, 1237 [3d Dept 2009], the court held: “Plaintiffs alternatively contend that the merger doctrine does not apply here because the faulty sewage system was a ‘latent defect.’ In support, they rely on Fehling v. Wicks, 179 Misc.2d 1041, 687 N.Y.S.2d 868 [1999] for the proposition that ‘where the purchaser discovers latent defects which are discoverable only after the purchaser occupies the premises,’ the merger doctrine is inapplicable (id. at 1042, 687 N.Y.S.2d 868). Importantly, however, the purported ‘latent defect’ exception to the merger doctrine has not been adopted by the Appellate Divisions or the Court of Appeals in these circumstances.”

In TIAA Glob. Investments, LLC v One Astoria Sq. LLC, 127 AD3d 75, 85 [1st Dept 2015], the court held (emphasis added):

The merger doctrine in a real estate transaction provides that once the deed is delivered, its terms are all that survive and the purchaser is barred from prosecuting any claims arising out of the contract (Ka Foon Lo v. Curis, 29 A.D.3d 525, 526, 815 N.Y.S.2d 131 [2d Dept.2006] ). The only exception to this rule is where the parties clearly intended that the particular provision of the contract supporting the claim would survive the delivery of the deed (id.). Further, an “as is” clause in a contract to sell real property will ordinarily bar a claim for breach of contract (see Board of Mgrs. of the Chelsea 19 Condominium v. Chelsea 19 Assoc., 73 A.D.3d 581, 581, 905 N.Y.S.2d 8 [1st Dept.2010] ). Plaintiff argues that the merger doctrine does not apply here because of the latent nature of the defects at issue. It further contends that its allegations of deceptive behavior on Seller’s part to mask the true condition of the building render the “as is” clause inoperable.

Although plaintiff cites trial court opinions identifying a latency exception to the merger doctrine, the concept has not been adopted by any of the Appellate Divisions or by the Court of Appeals (see Arnold v. Wilkins, 61 A.D.3d 1236, 1237, 876 N.Y.S.2d 780 [3d Dept.2009]), and we are not adopting it here.

It was urged that the seller was bound to the decisions of the Appellate Divisions, as the Second Department has not opined on the issue yet. See, Summit Const. Services Group, Inc. v Act Abatement, LLC, 34 Misc 3d 823, 831 [Sup Ct 2011] (“The general rule is that trial courts must follow applicable decisions of the Appellate Division in their Department. If there is no decision from the Appellate Division in the Department in which the trial court is located, the trial court must follow the decision of another Department. This is because the Appellate Division is a single statewide court divided into departments for administrative convenience.”)

Seller did not engage in active concealment

The buyer’s attorney also argued that there was active concealment of defects by the seller. The complaint failed to make any allegation that the buyer was somehow thwarted by the seller from conducting any inspections or due diligence which could have discovered the purported defects. It was necessary for the buyer to allege material facts as essential allegations that the seller thwarted any efforts on his part to perform his due diligence. See, Jablonski v Rapalje, 14 AD3d 484, 485 [2d Dept 2005] (“To maintain a cause of action to recover damages for active concealment, the plaintiff must show, in effect, that the seller or the seller’s agents thwarted the plaintiff’s efforts to fulfill his responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat emptor.”)

In Laxer v Edelman, 75 AD3d 584, 586 [2d Dept 2010], the Second Department held:

New York adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and imposes no liability on a seller [or the seller’s agent] for failing to disclose information regarding the premises when the parties deal at arm’s length, unless there is some conduct on the part of the seller[‘s agent] which constitutes active concealment” of a defective condition (Simone v Homecheck Real Estate Servs., Inc., 42 AD3d 518, 520 [2007]; see Daly v Kochanowicz, 67 AD3d 78, 87 [2009]; cf. Real Property Law §§ 462, 465). Moreover, even proof of active concealment will not suffice when the plaintiff should have known of the defect (see Richardson v United Funding, Inc., 16 AD3d 570, 571 [2005]). A plaintiff seeking to recover damages for active concealment must show that the defendant “thwarted” the plaintiff’s efforts to fulfill his or her responsibilities imposed by the doctrine of caveat emptor (Kerusa Co. LLC v W10Z/515 Real Estate Ltd. Partnership, 12 NY3d 236, 245 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rozen v 7 Calf Cr., LLC, 52 AD3d 590, 593 [2008]).

Based on the arguments presented, the judge granted the motion to dismiss. The judge held that the “defendants have established that the merger doctrine bars any claims arising out of the contract, requiring dismissal of the plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of contract. In a real estate transaction, the merger doctrine provides that, once title to the property closed and the deed was delivered, any claims that the plaintiff might have had arising from the contract of sale were extinguished.”


End Notes

[1] Section 11(c) stated: Except as otherwise expressly set forth in this contract, none of Seller’s covenants, representations, warranties or other obligations contained in this contract shall survive Closing.

Section 12 stated: Condition of Property. Purchaser acknowledges and represents that Purchaser is fully aware of the physical condition and state of repair of the Premises and of all property included in this sale, based on Purchaser’s own inspection and investigation and not upon any information, data, statements or representations, written or oral, as to the physical condition, state of repair, use, cost or operation or any other matter related to the Premises or the other property included in the sale, given or made by Seller or its representatives, and shall accept the same “as is” except as set forth herein in their present condition and state of repair; subject to reasonable use, wear, tear and natural deterioration between the date hereof and the date of Closing (except as otherwise set forth in paragraph 16(f), without any reduction in the purchase price or claim of any kind for any change in such condition by reason thereof subsequent to the date of this contract. Purchaser and its authorized representatives shall have the right, at reasonable times and upon reasonable notice (by telephone or otherwise) to Seller, to inspect the Premises before Closing.

Section 28 stated: Miscellaneous. (a) All prior understandings, agreements, representations and warranties, oral or written, between Seller and Purchaser are merged in this contract; it completely expresses their full agreement and has been entered into after full investigation, neither party relying upon any statement made by anyone else that is not set forth in this contract.

Rider at Section 12 stated: Tenancies. The purchaser herein agrees to take title to the Premises, SUBJECT TO the following tenancies: NONE. PURCHASER SHALL RECEIVE A CREDIT OF $5,000 FROM SELLER FOR THE LOWER RENT AMOUNTS & SECURITY DEPOSITS.

Rider at Section 15 stated: No representations by Seller. Seller makes no warranties or representations concerning the physical condition, work repairs, renovations, or improvements, if any, income, expenses for operation, taxes or fitness of the Premises except as specifically set forth herein. The Purchaser acknowledges that they have physically inspected the Premises prior to signing this Contract and are aware of the physical condition of the Premises and agree to take the Premises in “AS IS CONDITION” in its present physical condition. Purchaser acknowledges that the Seller has made no representation or warranties and concerning the physical condition of the Premises other than those that are specifically set forth herein. The Seller shall not be bound by or liable for any representations, oral or written, pertaining to the Premises, furnished or made by any real estate broker or salesperson, agent or employee, servant or other, unless same is specifically set forth herein. Notwithstanding, none of the representations, warranties, covenants or other obligations of SELLERS hereunder shall survive the CLOSING, except as expressly provided herein. Acceptance of the deed by PURCHASERS shall be deemed full and complete performance and discharge of every agreement and obligation of SELLERS hereunder, except those, if any, which expressly are stated herein to survive the CLOSING.

Rider at Section 22 stated: Delivery and Acceptance of the Deed. The delivery and acceptance of the deed at closing by the Purchaser shall constitute full compliance by the Seller of all of the terms and conditions of this Contract, and none of the terms and conditions of this Contract shall survive the delivery of the deed unless specifically stated otherwise.

Rider at Section 32 stated: Entire Understanding. This agreement constitutes the entire Contract between the parties. It may not be modified orally or in any other manner except by an agreement in writing signed by the parties hereto.

Rider at Section 38 stated: Property Condition Disclosure Credit. Seller will not provide to the Purchaser the Property Condition Disclosure Statement under Article 14 of the New York Real Property Law. The Purchaser agrees to the $500.00 monetary credit as set forth in section 465(a) of the Property Condition Disclosure Act. By the acceptance of a $500.00 credit, the purchaser waives any failure or misrepresentation whether of not knowing or willful on the part of the Seller. The purchase price reflected herein is net of the $500.00 given by Seller to Purchaser as a credit in lieu of Purchasers receiving a property condition disclosure statement from Sellers.

Richard A. Klass, Esq.
Your Court Street Lawyer

#caveatemptor, #buyerbeware, #realestatelaw

Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn, New York. He may be reached at (718) COURT●ST or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

© 2021 Richard A. Klass

Scales of justice

Plaintiffs could not show that the continuous representation toll applied.

In Pace v Horowitz, 190 AD3d 619 [1st Dept 2021], the plaintiffs could not show that the continuous representation toll applied. It was held:

The court correctly determined that plaintiffs failed to show that there is an issue of fact as to whether the legal malpractice claim was timely filed based on the application of the continuous representation doctrine toll (see Marzario v. Snitow Kanfer Holzer & Millus, LLP, 178 A.D.3d 527, 528, 116 N.Y.S.3d 199 [1st Dept. 2019] ). The continuous representation doctrine toll does not apply based merely on the existence of an ongoing professional relationship, but only where the particular course of representation giving rise to the particular problems resulting in the alleged malpractice is ongoing (see Matter of Lawrence, 24 N.Y.3d 320, 341, 998 N.Y.S.2d 698, 23 N.E.3d 965 [2014]; Williamson v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 9 N.Y.3d 1, 840 N.Y.S.2d 730, 872 N.E.2d 842 [2007] ). Here, while plaintiffs allege that defendant law firm provided continuing estate administration work as part of an ongoing professional relationship of estate administration, they do not adequately allege that the particular course of representation regarding the sale of estate assets in 2007, which gave rise to the malpractice allegations, continued through February 2015, so as to make the instant malpractice claim timely filed.

R. A. Klass
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Court relied on an order as documentary evidence.

In Zeppieri v Vinson, 190 AD3d 1173 [3d Dept 2021], the court affirmed the dismissal of a legal malpractice action where the lower court relied on an order as documentary evidence. The court held:

Plaintiff Thomas J. Zeppieri is the Chief Executive Officer of plaintiff Adirondack Entertainment and Recreation, Inc. Defendant Jessica Hugabone Vinson is an attorney employed by defendant Barlett, Pontiff, Stewart & Rhodes, P.C. Plaintiffs retained defendants to represent them against Adirondack Lakeview, LLC and The Fort Henry Corp. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Adirondack Lakeview) in a property boundary dispute (hereinafter the underlying action). In the underlying action, Adirondack Lakeview alleged causes of action contending encroachment and trespass. Defendants, on plaintiffs’ behalf, answered and asserted counterclaims for adverse possession and a prescriptive easement. Following a trial in the underlying action, Supreme Court (Muller, J.), by order dated July 3, 2018, found plaintiffs liable for encroachment and trespass and dismissed plaintiffs’ counterclaims as meritless.

Thereafter, plaintiffs commenced this action for legal malpractice. The primary contention in the amended complaint was that Vinson failed to object to inadmissible hearsay testimony by Robert F. Flacke, Adirondack Lakeview’s president, and that such testimony destroyed their counterclaims for adverse possession and easement by prescription. Defendants moved, pre-answer, to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) and 3013, arguing, among other things, that plaintiffs’ claims were vague, conclusory and otherwise refuted by documentary evidence. Supreme Court (McGrath, J.) found that the July 2018 order constituted documentary evidence that directly refuted plaintiffs’ primary allegation of malpractice and that the remaining allegations were conclusory. As such, Supreme Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Plaintiffs appeal arguing that Supreme Court erred in relying on impermissible documentary evidence.

To recover damages for legal malpractice, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and that the attorney’s breach of this duty proximately caused plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages. To establish causation, a plaintiff must show that he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action or would not have incurred any damages, but for the lawyer’s negligence” (Rudolf v. Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 N.Y.3d 438, 442, 835 N.Y.S.2d 534, 867 N.E.2d 385 [2007] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Mid–Hudson Val. Fed. Credit Union v. Quartararo & Lois, PLLC, 155 A.D.3d 1218, 1219–1220, 64 N.Y.S.3d 389 [2017], affd 31 N.Y.3d 1090, 78 N.Y.S.3d 703, 103 N.E.3d 774 [2018] ). When determining whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, “the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference” (MLB Constr. Servs., LLC v. Lake Ave. Plaza, LLC, 156 A.D.3d 983, 984, 66 N.Y.S.3d 568 [2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Sim v. Farley Equip. Co. LLC, 138 A.D.3d 1228, 1228, 30 N.Y.S.3d 736 [2016] ). “However, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not entitled to any such consideration” (Myers v. Schneiderman, 30 N.Y.3d 1, 11, 62 N.Y.S.3d 838, 85 N.E.3d 57 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Wisdom v. Reoco, LLC, 162 A.D.3d 1380, 1381, 79 N.Y.S.3d 717 [2018] ).

“A motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the complaint as barred by documentary evidence may be properly granted only if the documentary evidence utterly refutes the plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law. To qualify as documentary evidence, the evidence must be unambiguous and of undisputed authenticity” (Koziatek v. SJB Dev. Inc., 172 A.D.3d 1486, 1486, 99 N.Y.S.3d 480 [2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). “[I]t is clear that judicial records, as well as … any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable, would qualify as documentary evidence in the proper case” (Jenkins v. Jenkins, 145 A.D.3d 1231, 1234, 44 N.Y.S.3d 223 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Magee–Boyle v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 173 A.D.3d 1157, 1159, 105 N.Y.S.3d 90 [2019] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted] ).

In support of their motion, defendants submitted the July 2018 order, the transcript of the bench trial and an email that had been accepted into evidence. The July 2018 order clearly qualifies as documentary evidence. As Supreme Court observed, the July 2018 order “refutes plaintiffs’ primary contention that defendants’ failure to object to Flacke’s testimony was the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ damages.” Where Supreme Court specifically states that its order is based on the decision from the underlying action, we find ourselves with “the proper case” in which a judicial record qualifies as appropriate documentary evidence sufficient to defeat the action (Jenkins v. Jenkins, 145 A.D.3d at 1234, 44 N.Y.S.3d 223). Moreover, even if the court also relied on the underlying transcript, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, there is no per se prohibition on said reliance, where, as here, the contents of the transcript are undeniable (see Tyree v. Castrovinci, 164 A.D.3d 1399, 1400, 81 N.Y.S.3d 741 [2018] ). We agree that Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint based upon documentary evidence (see Ganje v. Yusuf, 133 A.D.3d 954, 957, 19 N.Y.S.3d 355 [2015]; Doller v. Prescott, 167 A.D.3d 1298, 1300, 91 N.Y.S.3d 533 [2018] ). Given our finding, the remainder of plaintiffs’ arguments are academic.

R. A. Klass
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Ejectment of Boxing Gym: Throw in the Towel!

Two men in business suits in boxing ring, one unconscious on the mat, one standing. Illustrating article by Richard Klass about ejectment of a boxing gym.

COVID-19 has had a deleterious effect on New York’s commercial landlords. Due to the pandemic, many tenants have been unable to meet their lease obligations; in turn, this has resulted in the domino effect of landlords being unable to meet their mortgage obligations. Landlords have been hampered from evicting non-paying commercial tenants because of the Governor’s executive orders placing a moratorium on commercial evictions for over a year.

Caught up in the current quagmire, landlords whose tenants have defaulted under their commercial leases for reasons other than nonpayment of rent have had a difficult time removing them from the premises.

Boxing gym with troubling lease violations

According to the landlord, a fitness center specializing in boxing, martial arts and MMA-inspired workout routines was violating the terms of its lease prior to the pandemic. The allegations against the fitness center included:

  • Lack of special fitness center permit: NYC Zoning Regulations §12-10 define a “physical culture or health establishment” as “any establishment or facility, including commercial and non-commercial clubs, which is equipped and arranged to provide instruction, services, or activities which improve or affect a person’s physical condition by physical exercise or by massage.” The NYC Department of Buildings requires that businesses operating as a physical culture establishment or facility have a special permit in order to operate. The tenant never obtained the special permit and was alleged to have abandoned the application process;
  • Failure to obtain a health club license: The tenant agreed in the lease to “file any and all applications for permits and licenses required by any local, federal, state or city municipal agency for the conduct of tenant’s business and the operation and maintenance of the demised premises.” The lack of the license was alleged to be a breach of the lease;
  • Dissolution of corporation: The tenant was operating the fitness center despite the corporation having been dissolved by the New York Secretary of State years ago;
  • Lack of insurance: The lease required the tenant to maintain general liability insurance to cover any claims for bodily injury or death or property damage occurring on the premises of at lease $2 million per occurrence. The tenant did not provide the landlord with proof of insurance;
  • Non-payment of rent: The landlord claimed substantial rent arrears were due from the tenant for many months’ worth of rent and taxes owed.

Immediate Request for Order of Ejectment

The landlord retained Richard A. Klass, Esq., Your Court Street Lawyer, to bring an action against the fitness center to regain possession of the premises. An action for “ejectment” of the tenant from the premises was commenced and an Order to Show Cause was immediately filed, asking the judge to issue an Order of Ejectment.

Preliminary injunction request

Under CPLR 6301, a court is authorized to grant a preliminary injunction where it appears that the defendant threatens or is about to do an act in violation of the plaintiff’s rights regarding the subject of the action, which would tend to render any judgment ineffectual. The court may also grant a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) where it appears that there is the potential for immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage. The plaintiff must show that: (1) there is a likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm will occur without an injunction; and (3) a balancing of the equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor. See, Hoeffner v. John F. Frank Inc., 302 AD2d 428 [2 Dept. 2003].

  • Likelihood of success on the merits: The landlord alleged that the tenant remained in possession of the premises, continuing to operate its fitness center, despite the lease having been terminated; the tenant owing substantial rent arrears; the corporation having been dissolved; there being no license or permit to operate as a health club; and the lack of insurance coverage. The landlord made a prima facie showing of its right to relief. See, Terrell v. Terrell, 279 AD2d 301 [1 Dept. 2001].
  • Irreparable harm or injury: The tenant allegedly continued operating as a fitness center to the detriment of not only the landlord but also its gym patrons and the general public. The landlord urged that the threats to the public included the lack of liability insurance, operating an unlicensed facility with lack of proper permits, and the potential exposure of bodily injury or damage claims. These were alleged to be of actual, imminent harms to be suffered and were not remote possibilities or speculation. See, Khan v. State University of New York Health Science Center at Brooklyn, 271 AD2d 656 [1 Dept. 2000].
  • Balancing of the equities: The landlord asked the judge to consider the harms each side would suffer and that they would tilt in favor of ejecting the tenant. In balancing the equities of the situation, “it must be shown that the irreparable injury to be sustained … is more burdensome [to the plaintiff] than the harm caused to the defendant through imposition of the injunction.” McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel, Inc. v. W.J. Nolan & Co. Inc., 114 AD2d 165 [2 Dept. 1986].

The judge considered the landlord’s request and granted the Order of Ejectment. The New York City Sheriff immediately issued process on the fitness center and, acting on the Order of Ejectment, delivered possession of the boxing gym to the landlord.

R. A. Klass
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Joint Venture Agreements – I would do anything for [my partners] but I won’t do that…

Three business partners arguing to illustrate an article by Richard Klass about Joint Venture Agreements

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Two partners owned vacant lots in Manhattan and wanted to build on them. They found two developers who pitched building townhouses on the lots. The four of them entered into a joint venture agreement (“JVA”). [1] Essentially, the agreement was that, in return for the developers paying off debts owed on the lots, refinancing an existing mortgage and obtaining a new construction loan, the lot owners would transfer the property to a limited liability company (“LLC”) to be jointly owned by all four of them.

Joint Venture Agreement

According to the JVA, ownership of the new LLC would be equally divided among the four partners (25% each). The LLC was supposed to refinance the property. The funds from the refinance would first be utilized to satisfy the existing mortgage on the property and then finance all of the construction costs for three single-family townhouses. The developers were to use their best efforts to obtain a construction loan to perform the purpose of the joint venture, and the lot owners were to fully cooperate in these efforts.

Formation of the LLC

One of the developers formed an LLC into which title to the lots would be transferred. The LLC was initially formed with him as the sole member for convenience purposes until the prospective refinance and closing were to take place, at which time all four partners would constitute the members.

Lack of cooperation

In order to comply with the mortgage lender’s requests about the property, the developers needed certain back-up documentation from the lot owners concerning expenses. The lot owners did not provide the requested items. Ultimately, they stopped cooperating with the developers. The developers retained Richard A. Klass, Esq., Your Court Street Lawyer, to pursue their rights under the joint venture agreement, including suing for breach of contract and to enforce a constructive trust over the vacant lots.

In response to the developers’ claims, the lot owners contended that they properly rejected the demand to transfer title to the property to the new LLC. They claimed that they were never provided with an operating agreement that named all four of the partners as members. The lot owners declared, “There was no way it was either reasonable or pursuant to the terms of the JVA that we were going to transfer the property worth at least $4,000,000.00 to an LLC in which we had no ownership interest and no control.”

The developers asserted that this defense was pretext — the lot owners never intended on complying with the joint venture agreement from the start. As fully laid out before the arbitrator, both in testimony and documentary evidence, the developers established that this defense was unfounded based on several facts: (1) the transfer tax documents, prepared by the title company, reflected all four joint venturers’ names and respective 25% interests in the new LLC; [2] (2) One of the lot owners himself emailed the title company the names of all four people for the new LLC; (3) the developer emailed the mortgage lender that all four people were partners in the new LLC; (4) the developer informed the lot owner that the mortgage lender needed a draft of the operating agreement, Excel spreadsheet and all checks following; and (5) the developers made various, substantial payments in furtherance of their joint venture prior to any deed transfer.

The developers claimed that the lot owners wrongfully breached their fiduciary duty that was created when they entered into the joint venture.[3] As joint venturers, the developers asserted the lot owners owed them a fiduciary duty to supply financial information which was within their exclusive control and they breached their duty by intentionally failing to cooperate and disclose pertinent information. Cooperation on the part of both sides to a contract is implied in every contract. See, Madison Pictures, Inc. v Pictorial Films, Inc., 6 Misc 2d 302, 324-25 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (“Where a matter is particularly within the knowledge of one party, it is his duty to supply the information.”); see also Weeks v. Rector of Trinity Church in City of New York, 56 App.Div. 195, 67 N.Y.S. 670, 672 (1st Dept. l900) (“The rule of law is that, when the obligation of performance by one party to a contract presupposes the doing of another act by the other party prior thereto, there arises an implied obligation of the second party to do the act which the performance of the contract necessarily…”).

The arbitrator determined that the developers were entitled to compensation from the lot owners for their substantial investment of time and money into the project. The arbitrator awarded half of the value of the property along with reimbursement for all of their expenses.

[1] Under New York law, five elements are necessary to form a joint venture: “(1) two or more persons must enter into a specific agreement to carry on an enterprise for profit; (2) their agreement must evidence their intent to be joint venturers; (3) each must make a contribution of property, financing, skill, knowledge or effort; (4) each must have some degree of joint control over the venture; and (5) there must be a provision for the sharing of both profits and losses.” Dinaco, Inc. v. Time Warner Inc., 346 F.3d 64, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2003).

[2] It was noted that both the Joint Venture Agreement and the NYC Real Property Transfer (RPT) Tax Return served as documentary evidence of the respective LLC ownership interests of the parties. As held in Matter of Pappas v Corfian Enterprises, Ltd., 22 Misc 3d 1113(A) [Sup Ct 2009], affd, 76 AD3d 679 [2d Dept 2010]: “In the real world, particularly that in which close corporations operate, clear evidence of share ownership is often not found in the corporate books and records, for any number of reasons. Other evidence must be found, and the lodestar for admissibility and probative value must be the contractual foundation for shareholder status. A court may consider the intent of the parties, particularly evidence of an agreement to form a corporation. (See Matter of Estate of Purnell v. LH Radiologists, 90 N.Y.2d at 530, 664 N.Y.S.2d 238, 686 N.E.2d 1332; Blank v. Blank, 256 A.D.2d at 689, 681 N.Y.S.2d 377.) * * *

Documentary evidence may be particularly probative when the documents were created under circumstances in which there was no incentive to fabricate. Among the types of documents that courts have considered, and that have been proffered in this case, are corporate and personal tax returns, bank loan documents, and financial statements. (See Matter of Capizola v. Vantage International, Ltd., 2 A.D.3d at 845, 770 N.Y.S.2d 395; Blank v. Blank, 256 A.D.2d at 694, 681 N.Y.S.2d 377; Hunt v. Hunt, 222 A.D.2d at 761, 634 N.Y.S.2d 804.

[3] It is well settled that joint venturers are governed by the same good-faith requirements as co-partners and the creation of a joint venture “imposes a fiduciary relationship, and not a simple contract.” Learning Annex Holdings, LLC v Whitney Educ. Group, Inc., 765 F Supp 2d 403, 412 [SDNY 2011]. In order to demonstrate a breach of fiduciary duty, there must be: “(i) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (ii) a knowing breach of that duty; and (iii) damages resulting therefrom.” N. Shipping Funds I, LLC v Icon Capital Corp., 921 F Supp 2d 94, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)(Citing Johnson v. Nextel Communications, Inc., 660 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2011)).

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Scales of justice

“Slow Down, You Move Too Fast”

Simon & Garfunkel,
The 59th Street Bridge Song (Feelin’ Groovy)

Rabbit with yellow fur standing next to gray and yellow turtle illustrating article by Richard Klass about nonresident plaintiffs posting Security for Costs.

A foreign company sued a New York State resident, seeking to force the sale of his house in order to satisfy its judgment.  The company existed under New Jersey law with a New Jersey corporate address.  The house was located in Nassau County.

Petition to Sell House

The judgment creditor’s petition to sell real property alleged that there was sufficient equity in the house exceeding the homestead exemption and existing mortgage lien.  The petition further alleged that attempts to execute on the judgment debtor’s personal property failed and the creditor had otherwise been unable to satisfy its judgment.  Combined, these allegations would normally be enough to satisfy the pleading requirements under CPLR 5203, 5206 and 5238.

In response to the petition, the debtor/homeowner retained Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, to defend the proceeding in order to retain his house.  The defenses put up included the fact that the mortgage lender had already begun foreclosure proceedings and there was a question as to the validity of the claim that there was any net equity in the property.  Further, since the house was owned by the debtor with his wife as a “ tenancy by the entirety, ” the house could not be sold without consideration of her property rights.

Stopping the Creditor in its tracks

Sometimes, a debtor needs a respite from the continual attacks by creditors.  One way to accomplish this is by a bankruptcy filing, in which the automatic stay imposed upon filing stops the pecking at a debtor’s assets by creditors.  Another way to slow down a creditor is to temporarily stay the lawsuit while the debtor and his family “ circle the wagons ” to either gather up strong defenses or develop an orderly plan in which debts will be repaid or settled.  An effective method of getting this pause is by requesting that the judge stay the lawsuit of a non-New York State creditor until the plaintiff/creditor posts security for the costs of the action.

Security for Costs

New York court rules require nonresident plaintiffs maintaining lawsuits in New York courts to post security for the costs for which they would be liable if their lawsuits were unsuccessful.  CPLR 8501(a) provides that, “ except where the plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed as a poor person or is the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding, upon motion by the defendant without notice, the court or judge thereof shall order security for costs to be given by the plaintiffs where none of them is a domestic corporation, a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the state or a resident of the state when the motion is made. ” CPLR 8502 provides that until security for costs is given pursuant to court order, all proceedings other than to review or vacate such order shall be stayed, and that if the plaintiff shall not have given security for costs at the expiration of 30 days from the date of the order, the court may dismiss the complaint upon motion by the defendant.

Security for costs is a device ordinarily used against a nonresident plaintiff to make sure if he loses the case, he will not return home and leave the defendant with a costs judgment that can be enforced only in the plaintiff’s home state.  By directing a nonresident to post a bond, the defendant is protected from frivolous lawsuits and is assured that, if successful, he will be able to recover costs from the plaintiff.

In rebuffing a challenge to the constitutionality of the requirement of security for costs imposed upon a nonresident plaintiff, the court in Clement v. Durban, 147 AD3d 39 [2016] aff’d 32 NY3d 337 [2018] cert denied 139 S.Ct. 2649 [2019] held that the court rules do not deprive nonresident plaintiffs of reasonable and adequate access to New York courts and, thus, are constitutional.  Where nonresidents are subject to different treatment than New York residents, there must be reasonable grounds for diversity of treatment (so as to prevent discrimination against citizens of other states).  Disparity of treatment of nonresidents is permitted in situations where there are valid, independent reasons for it; in this situation, deterring frivolous or harassing lawsuits and preventing prevailing defendants from having to chase plaintiffs into foreign jurisdictions to collect their judgments are considered valid reasons.

Upon motion by the defendant requesting that the plaintiff post a bond as security for costs, the judge granted the motion and directed the nonresident plaintiff to post security in the amount of $10,000 for costs.  The plaintiff did not do so within the 30 day period after the order and, accordingly, the court dismissed the lawsuit.

Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2019 Richard A. Klass. Credits: Photo of Richard Klass by Rob Abruzzese, 2019. Marketing agency: The Innovation Works, Inc. (www.TheInnovationWorks.com)  Image at top of page: Shutterstock

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[ nonresident plaintiffs ]

Order of Attachment / Slash and Burn

Somewhat gory staged photo of a man with clown makeup, sitting on the ground, holding a hatchet, with blood on his shirt. Illustrates a case study about an order of attachment

[Reader Advisory:
This case study begins with a graphic and possibly upsetting description of violent events leading up to a criminal case. Then, the narrative continues with a discussion of the accompanying civil case. If the reader prefers to begin with the discussion of the civil case, they may skip to the second heading “Order of Attachment.”]

He Drove from New York to Florida.

“Jeff” drove to his ex-wife, “Lauren”‘s Florida condominium and attacked her in her home. Jeff handcuffed Lauren’s arms and legs so she was unable to move. Then, Jeff repeatedly cut, beat, suffocated, threatened and tortured his ex-wife for over six hours. Throughout this ordeal, Jeff forced Lauren to answer intimate questions by threatening her with a knife he held up to her neck, putting tape over her mouth and suffocating her by putting a pillow over her face. Jeff referred to this as “phase one” of his plan. He threatened to do her more harm during “phase two” of his planned attack.

While being held against her will, Lauren continuously pled with Jeff for her life and safe release to no avail. Lauren’s son-in-law saw the ordeal as it was taking place because Jeff was broadcasting it online. He called the police, who arrested Jeff before “phase two” could take place and, luckily, before further harm could be done to Lauren.

In the criminal case, the jury rendered verdicts against Jeff, finding him guilty of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon; kidnapping; aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; and assault. Jeff was sentenced to 15 years in prison.

Order of Attachment

Lauren retained a personal injury attorney to sue Jeff in a civil action in New York for the intentional torts he committed against her. Jeff owned a couple of buildings in New York and a half-interest in the Florida condominium. The attorney hired Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, as special counsel to seek to ” attach ” Jeff’s properties to ensure that he wouldn’t sell, mortgage or dispose of them in order to evade payment of monetary damages to Lauren.

An ” Order of Attachment ” is a provisional remedy used by a judge to ensure that there will be assets and property belonging to the defendant to pay any prospective judgment to be awarded to the plaintiff after trial. The operative rule, CPLR 6201, provides, in relevant part:

An order of attachment may be granted in any action, except a matrimonial action, where the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled, in whole or in part, or in the alternative, to a money judgment against one or more defendants, when:

3. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors or frustrate the enforcement of a judgment that might be rendered in plaintiff’s favor, has assigned, disposed of, encumbered or secreted property, or removed it from the state or is about to do any of these acts;

As held by the Second Department in Mineola Ford Sales Ltd. v Rapp, 242 AD2d 371, 371 [2d Dept 1997], ” In order to obtain an order of attachment under CPLR 6201(3), the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has or is about to conceal his or her property in one or more of several enumerated ways, and has acted or will act with the intent to defraud his or her creditors, or to frustrate the enforcement of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff (see, Arzu v. Arzu, 190 A.D.2d 87, 91, 597 N.Y.S.2d 322; Societe Generale Alsacienne De Banque, Zurich v. Flemingdon Dev. Corp., 118 A.D.2d 769, 772, 500 N.Y.S.2d 278). The moving papers must contain evidentiary facts-as opposed to conclusions-proving the fraud (Societe Generale Alsacienne De Banque, Zurich v. Flemingdon Dev. Corp., supra; see also, Rothman v. Rogers, 221 A.D.2d 330, 633 N.Y.S.2d 361; Rosenthal v. Rochester Button Co., 148 A.D.2d 375, 376, 539 N.Y.S.2d 11). In addition to proving fraudulent intent, the plaintiff must also show probable success on the merits of the underlying action in order to obtain an order of attachment (see, CPLR 6212[a]; Societe Generale Alsacienne De Banque, Zurich v. Flemingdon Dev. Corp., supra; Computer Strategies v. Commodore Business Machs., 105 A.D.2d 167, 172, 483 N.Y.S.2d 716). “

In her request for the Order of Attachment, Lauren provided recordings of jailhouse telephone conversations between Jeff and another party which demonstrated that Jeff intended on quickly transferring his various real estate interests, seemingly to avoid a prospective judgment against him. The judge decided to issue the Order of Attachment in order to keep Jeff’s real estate in place to ensure that Lauren would have available assets from which to collect her potential judgment.

Out-of-State Property May Be Attached.

As to the Florida condominium unit jointly owned by Lauren and Jeff, the judge determined that he had jurisdiction to issue an injunction to prevent Jeff from disposing of his interest in it. While generally a New York State court has jurisdiction over only property located within the State, it can exercise jurisdiction over property in another state under certain circumstances. See, Gryphon Domestic VI, LLC v. APP International Finance Company, B.V., 41 AD3d 25 [1st Dept. 2007] (New York court can restrain transfers of property outside the state so long as it has jurisdiction over the transferor).

The defendant Was Deemed a New York Domiciliary.

Jeff made a request of the judge to dismiss the lawsuit against him, claiming that the court did not have jurisdiction over him because he was now considered a Florida resident (because he ‘resides’ in jail in Florida). This request was challenged by showing the judge that Jeff’s last residence before entering prison was New York.

In Farrell v Lautob Realty Corp., 204 AD2d 597, 598 [2d Dept 1994], the Second Department held that:

…it is long-established law in New York that a person does not involuntarily lose his domicile as a result of imprisonment. …As stated by the Court of Appeals: ” [A] patient or inmate of an institution does not gain or lose a residence or domicile, but retains the domicile he had when he entered the institution ” (Matter of Corr v Westchester County Dept. of Social Servs., 33 NY2d 111, 115).

Further, the fact that the prison is located in a different state from the defendant’s previous state of domicile is irrelevant to the above jurisdictional rule. See, Poucher v. Intercounty Appliance Corp., 336 F.Supp.2d 251, 253 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (” It is well-established that a prisoner does not acquire a new domicile when he is incarcerated in a state different from his previous domicile.”)

Notice of Attachment

The judge granted the Order of Attachment in favor of Lauren. This allowed a Notice of Attachment to be filed against each of Jeff’s properties. A Notice of Attachment is similar to a Notice of Pendency (Lis Pendens) in that it serves as notice to others that there is a pending lawsuit that may affect the ownership of real estate. Once the Order of Attachment was granted, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, where Jeff agreed to transfer to Lauren one of his buildings and his half-interest in the condominium.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
Image at top of page: Shutterstock

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Free: RPAPL 881 Booklet by Richard A. Klass. Newly Published.

A Man’s Home Is (Not Always) His Castle:
RPAPL 881 License to Enter Neighbor’s Property

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Cover of book " A Man’s Home Is (Not Always) His Castle: RPAPL 881 License to Enter Neighbor’s Property " by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Download and view the free E-Book version in PDF format.
Click here to view the free on-line web-book.
12 pages/830 KB

Summary

A Man’s Home Is (Not Always) His Castle

In the current economic and political climate in New York City, which encourages building more and more housing units for the multitudes, it is not surprising that property owners are experiencing “growing pains.” Among those “growing pains” are the inconvenience and annoyance to neighboring property owners when a developer buys land next door, then seeks to build on that land, and must gain access through the adjacent owners’ property in order to do the work. Access may be needed to move equipment, build up to the property line, or deliver material to the building site.

RPAPL 881 grants a license to enter property:

New York law seeks to find middle ground between the property developer and the neighboring owner so that the developer may build its structure while the neighbor can be left relatively undisturbed.

(Click here to read the book.)

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What’s Yours Is Mine and What’s Mine Is Yours: Tenancy by the Entirety

Gray-haired couple in embrace illustrating article by Richard Klass Esq. about Tenancy by the Entirety

He owned his own house. When Harald married Florence a year later, he transferred title to the house from himself to “Harald and Florence, his wife.” By virtue of this language in the deed, ownership of the house was now held in a “ tenancy by the entirety ” (see, Estates, Powers & Trusts Law Section 6-2.2). After many years of marriage, Florence passed away, leaving Harald as the surviving spouse of the former tenancy by the entirety and sole owner of the house by operation of law. Subsequently, Harald transferred title to the house to his nieces.

Executor of Estate of Deceased Wife Sues

Florence’s executor brought a lawsuit against Harald and his two nieces to claim Florence’s share in the house as part of her estate. The executor demanded that the house be returned to Florence’s estate for disposition according to her Will. In response, Harald and his nieces filed motions to dismiss the lawsuit based upon documentary evidence.

Dismissal Based upon Documentary Evidence

Richard A. Klass, Esq., Your Court Street Lawyer, filed the motion to dismiss based upon documentary evidence. CPLR 3211(a)(1) provides that dismissal of a lawsuit is appropriate when the document itself resolves all factual issues as a matter of law. In order to be considered documentary evidence under CPLR 3211(a)(1), the evidence “must be unambiguous and of undisputed authenticity.” Rabos v. R&R Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d 849 [2012]; Fontanetta v. John Doe, 73 AD3d 78 [2010]. In considering such a motion, the court is to afford the complaint its most favorable intendment and the plaintiff’s allegations which are contrary to the documentary evidence are to be accepted. However, “a complaint containing factual claims that are flatly contradicted by documentary evidence should be dismissed.” See, Well v. Rambam, 300 AD2d 580 [2002].

Tenancy by the Entirety Deed

Quoting from an 1883 decision from the NYS Court of Appeals, a “ tenancy by the entirety ” is derived from the common law (“when land was conveyed to husband and wife, they did not take as tenants in common or as joint tenants but each became seized of the entirety, and upon the death of either the whole survived to the other.”) On the death of either spouse, the property’s title vested in the other spouse because the survivor is deemed the representative of the single ownership. Indeed, the surviving spouse receives the entire property interest free and clear of any debts, claims, liens or encumbrances against the deceased spouse. See, Cormack v. Burks, 150 AD3d 1198 [2017].

Longstanding New York State law holds that a grant of real property to a husband and wife creates a tenancy by the entirety “unless expressly declared to be a joint tenancy or tenancy in common.” See, Prario v. Novo, 168 Misc.2d 610 [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co. 1996]; In re Faeth’s Will, 200 Misc. 143 [Sur. Ct., Queens Co. 1951]; Estates, Powers & Trusts Law § 6-2.2(b). Courts have recognized that a tenancy by the entirety cannot be altered without the mutual consent of the spouses or divorce. In Sciacca v. Sciacca, 185 Misc.2d 105 [Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 2000], the court held that: “As articulated by the Court of Appeals in Kahn v. Kahn, 43 N.Y.2d 203, a court cannot direct the disposition of property held by married couples as tenants by the entirety until the court first alters the marital status, such as by entering a judgment of divorce or separation. Indeed, the law is long-settled that neither entirety tenant may, without the consent of the other, dispose of any part of the property to defeat the right of survivorship.”

That the executor was pursuing rights on behalf of Florence’s estate was irrelevant. Numerous cases have held that, regardless of any purported disposition of real property owned by spouses as tenants by the entirety, the surviving spouse takes the whole by operation of law. See, e.g. Levenson v Levenson, 229 AD 402 [2d Dept 1930] (“A question of property held jointly was not involved. Naturally, the survivor took that regardless of the will.”); In re Maguire’s Estate, 251 AD 337 [2d Dept 1937], affd sub nom, 277 NY 527 [1938] (“In an estate by the entirety the husband and wife are each seized of the entire estate, per tout et non per my. Each owns, not an undivided part, but the whole estate. ‘The survivor, upon the death of the other, does not take a new acquisition, but holds under the original grant or devise, the estate being merely freed from participation by the other.”)

At the time of Florence’s death, she and Harald were still married. There was also no evidence that they altered their tenancy by the entirety either by judicial decree (such as a divorce judgment) or written instrument satisfying General Obligations Law Section 3-309. Therefore, the Deed itself was dispositive of the issue of ownership of the house vesting solely into Harald as the surviving spouse.

Foreign Affidavit Properly Accepted by Court

In support of the motion to dismiss the lawsuit, Harald submitted his affidavit signed by him in Jamaica, his new home country. The executor took issue with the court accepting the affidavit without it having been executed before a Notary Public. In rejecting this argument, the court noted that Harald’s affidavit was signed in accordance with the rule set forth in CPLR 2106(b) (“The statement of any person, when that person is physically located outside the geographic boundaries of the United States, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, subscribed and affirmed by that person to be true under the penalties of perjury, may be used in an action in lieu of and with the same force and effect as an affidavit. Such affirmation shall be in substantially the following form:

I affirm this … day of ……, …., under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York, which may include a fine or imprisonment, that I am physically located outside the geographic boundaries of the United States, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, that the foregoing is true, and I understand that this document may be filed in an action or proceeding in a court of law.”)

Based upon the above long-standing case law, the court determined that there was no valid cause of action against the defendants. In making that determination, the court cited to the rule that “the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from the four corners factual allegations are discerned which, taken together, manifest any cause of action cognizable at law, a motion to dismiss will fail… However, allegations constituting bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not entitled to any such considerations.”

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…plaintiff could not establish liability because he could not prove the underlying action.

In Blair v Loduca, 164 AD3d 637, 638-40 [2d Dept 2018], the Second Department considered the argument made by the defendant-attorney sued for legal malpractice that the plaintiff could not establish liability because he could not prove the underlying action.

“ To establish the required element of causation in a legal malpractice action, ‘ a plaintiff must show that he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action … but for the lawyer’s negligence ’ ” (Balan v. Rooney, 152 A.D.3d 733, 733, 61 N.Y.S.3d 29, quoting Rudolf v. Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 N.Y.3d 438, 442, 835 N.Y.S.2d 534, 867 N.E.2d 385; see Detoni v. McMinkens, 147 A.D.3d 1018, 48 N.Y.S.3d 208). The only issue raised in the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was whether the plaintiff could have prevailed in the underlying action against the property owner.

In a premises liability case, a defendant property owner who moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the allegedly *639 dangerous or defective condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence (see Martino v. Patmar Props., Inc., 123 A.D.3d 890, 890, 999 N.Y.S.2d 449; Kruger v. Donzelli Realty Corp., 111 A.D.3d 897, 975 N.Y.S.2d 689; Smith v. Christ’s First Presbyt. Church of Hempstead, 93 A.D.3d 839, 941 N.Y.S.2d 211; Meyers v. Big Six Towers, Inc., 85 A.D.3d 877, 925 N.Y.S.2d 607). “ Under the so-called ‘ storm in progress ’ rule, a property owner will not be held responsible for accidents occurring as a result of the accumulation of snow and ice on its premises until an adequate period of time has passed following the cessation of the storm to allow the owner an opportunity to ameliorate the hazards caused by the storm ” (Marchese v. Skenderi, 51 A.D.3d 642, 642, 856 N.Y.S.2d 680; see Solazzo v. New York City Tr. Auth., 6 N.Y.3d 734, 810 N.Y.S.2d 121, 843 N.E.2d 748; Dumela–Felix v. FGP W. St., LLC, 135 A.D.3d 809, 810, 22 N.Y.S.3d 896; McCurdy v. Kyma Holdings, LLC, 109 A.D.3d 799, 799, 971 N.Y.S.2d 137; Smith v. Christ’s First Presbyt. Church of Hempstead, 93 A.D.3d 839, 840, 941 N.Y.S.2d 211; Weller v. Paul, 91 A.D.3d 945, 947, 938 N.Y.S.2d 152; Mazzella v. City of New York, 72 A.D.3d 755, 756, 899 N.Y.S.2d 291). If a storm is ongoing, and a property owner elects to remove snow, the owner must do so with reasonable care or it could be held liable for creating a hazardous condition or exacerbating a natural hazard created by the storm (see Kantor v. Leisure Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc., 95 A.D.3d 1177, 944 N.Y.S.2d 640; Petrocelli v. Marrelli Dev. Corp., 31 A.D.3d 623, 817 N.Y.S.2d 913; Salvanti v. Sunset Indus. Park Assoc., 27 A.D.3d 546, 813 N.Y.S.2d 110; Chaudhry v. East Buffet & Rest., 24 A.D.3d 493, 808 N.Y.S.2d 239). In such an instance, that property owner, if moving for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case, must demonstrate in support of his or her motion that the snow removal efforts he or she undertook neither created nor exacerbated the allegedly hazardous condition which caused the injured plaintiff to fall (see Kantor v. Leisure Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc., 95 A.D.3d at 1177, 944 N.Y.S.2d 640).

In support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in this action, the defendants submitted the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the deposition testimony of the building’s doorman, the affidavit of a meteorologist, and certified climatological data. These submissions demonstrated that a storm was in progress at the time of the accident, that there was no preexisting ice on the ground when the storm commenced, and that the property owner did not create or exacerbate the allegedly dangerous condition created by the storm in progress (see Aronov v. St. Vincent’s Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 145 A.D.3d 648, 649, 43 N.Y.S.3d 99; **135 Kantor v. Leisure Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc., 95 A.D.3d at 1177, 944 N.Y.S.2d 640; Ali v. Village of Pleasantville, 95 A.D.3d 796, 797, 943 N.Y.S.2d 582). Since the defendants made a prima facie showing that the storm in progress rule applied *640 to the underlying action, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to show that something other than the precipitation from the storm in progress caused the accident (see Baker v. St. Christopher’s Inn, Inc., 138 A.D.3d 652, 653, 29 N.Y.S.3d 439; Burniston v. Ranric Enters. Corp., 134 A.D.3d 973, 974, 21 N.Y.S.3d 694; Meyers v. Big Six Towers, Inc., 85 A.D.3d 877, 877–878, 925 N.Y.S.2d 607; Alers v. La Bonne Vie Org., 54 A.D.3d 698, 699, 863 N.Y.S.2d 750). The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint because the plaintiff could not have prevailed in the underlying action against the property owner (see Rudolf v. Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 N.Y.3d at 442, 835 N.Y.S.2d 534, 867 N.E.2d 385; Balan v. Rooney, 152 A.D.3d at 733, 61 N.Y.S.3d 29; Detoni v. McMinkens, 147 A.D.3d at 1018, 48 N.Y.S.3d 208).

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