Important for parties in litigation to appear before court on all conferences and motion hearing dates
It is very important for parties in litigation to appear before the court on all conferences and motion hearing dates. In a recent legal malpractice case (Stein v Davidow, Davidow, Siegel & Stern, LLP, 157 AD3d 741, 742–43 [2d Dept 2018] , the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to vacate their default. The court held that:
In order to vacate a default in appearing at a scheduled court conference, a plaintiff must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 5015[a] ; Wright v. City of Poughkeepsie, 136 A.D.3d 809, 809, 24 N.Y.S.3d 523; Mazzio v. Jennings, 128 A.D.3d 1032, 1032, 8 N.Y.S.3d 596; Hanscom v. Goldman, 109 A.D.3d 964, 965, 972 N.Y.S.2d 76). A determination of whether an excuse is reasonable lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see GMAC Mtge., LLC v. Guccione, 127 A.D.3d 1136, 1138, 9 N.Y.S.3d 83; Herrera v. MTA Bus Co., 100 A.D.3d 962, 963, 954 N.Y.S.2d 631).
Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the plaintiffs did not offer a reasonable excuse for their default. Neither the fact that Stein was proceeding pro se nor his claims that he was unaware of the consequences of failing to appear constitute a reasonable excuse (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Slavinski, 78 A.D.3d 1167, 1167, 912 N.Y.S.2d 285; Dorrer v. Berry, 37 A.D.3d 519, 520, 830 N.Y.S.2d 277). The plaintiffs’ remaining arguments to support their contention that their default should be excused are improperly raised for the first time on appeal, and have not been considered by this Court *743 see Tulino v. Tulino, 148 A.D.3d 755, 757, 48 N.Y.S.3d 258; Point Holding, LLC v. Crittenden, 119 A.D.3d 918, 920, 990 N.Y.S.2d 575).
As the plaintiffs failed to offer a reasonable excuse for their default, the issue of whether the plaintiffs had a potentially meritorious cause of action need not be addressed (see U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Dorvelus, 140 A.D.3d 850, 852, 32 N.Y.S.3d 631; Vested Bus. Brokers, Ltd. v. Ragone, 131 A.D.3d 1232, 1234, 17 N.Y.S.3d 447; Abdelqader v. Abdelqader, 120 A.D.3d 1275, 1276, 993 N.Y.S.2d 71). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate their default.